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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Objectives
The purpose of this research project was to refine
the current notion of system reliability by identifying
and investigating attributes of a system which are
important to reliability considerations, and to develop
techniques which facilitate analysis of system reliability.
Attributes selected for investigation included:
(a) Fault tolerance - the ability to maintain error-
free input-output behavior in the presence of
(temporary and/or permanent) faults in the
system.
(b) Diagnosability - the ability to detect and
locate faults in the system
(c) Reconfigurability - the ability to reconfigure
the system after the occurrence of a fault so
as to realize the original behavior or some
other (possibly less complex) behavior
with the following objectives:
I. To determine, relative to the above attributes,
properties of system structure that are conducive to a
particular attribute. Structures so considered will range
from state-transition functions at one extreme to hardware
and software realizations at the other extreme.
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II. To determine methods for obtaining reliable
realizations of a given system behavior. In particular,
one would like to obtain realizations which are fault
tolerant (relative to the specified behavior) and yet
diagnosable (relative to some extended behavior).
III. To determine how properties of system behavior
relate to the complexity of fault tolerant (diagnosable,
reconfigurable) realizations. Once such relationships
are discovered, the inherent fault tolerance (diagno-
sability, reconfigurability) of a given behavior could
be measured by the minimum complexity of realizations
possessing that reliability attribute.
IV. To determine methods for evaluating the reliability
of a proposed or existing system as measured in terms.of
fault tolerance, diagnosability, reconfigurability, or
combinations of these attributes. This includes the
investigation of appropriate reliability measures,
modeling techniques, and computational methods for
determining, or at least estimating, system reliability.
After initiation of the grant, the above proposed
objectives were augmented to obtain a more definitive
statement of what research should be accomplished to
meet the needs of NASA and, in particular, the Langley
Research Center. The following statements of these
augmented objectives were due primarily to the constructive
suggestions of NASA-Langley, with some subsequent modifi-
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cation in wording to conform more closely with our
interpretation:
I. To develop formal concepts and establish mathe-
matical results which can be used to precisely define
measures of system utility, e.g.:
1. Measures of fault tolerance;
2. Measures of recoverability based on measures
of detectability, locatability and recon-
figurability;
3. Measures of system availability with respect
to different levels of system performance;
4. Measures of total system "worth" based on
measures of performance worth and measures
of performance availability.
II. To develop analytic and simulation methods for
evaluating system utility measures.
III. To determine architectural characteristics of
fault-tolerant systems that are amenable to fault detection
and fault location.
IV. To investigate methods of on-line diagnosis that
are applicable to specific subsystems of a fault-tolerant
computing system, e.g.:
--given an arithmetic unit subject to a specified
class of faults, design a detector that, with a
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specified allowable time delay, will detect
any error produced by a fault.
V. To investigate methods of augmenting the structure
of specific hardware or software subsystems in order to
facilitate detector design and improveon-line diagno-
sability.
1.2 Personnel
To meet the objectives stated in Section 1.1, it was
estimated that the following technical effort would be
required:
Principal Investigator
25 per cent time, academic year
100 per cent time, two months, summer
Research Assistants
1 at 50 per cent time, academic year
2 at 25 per cent time, academic
3 at 100 per cent time, summer
Programmer
25 per cent time, fiscal year
During the period 1 January - 31 December, 1974 (referred
to as the "reporting period") research personnel and their
level of effort have been:
Principal Investigator
John F. Meyer
25 per cent time, January - May
100 per cent time, June
25 per cent time, September - December
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Research Assistants
David E. Frisque
20 per cent time, January -- April
100 per cent time, May - July
25 per cent time, September - December
Carolyn P. Steinhaus
13 per cent time, February - April
100 per cent time, May - July
50 per cent time, September - December
Robert J. Sundstrom
54 per cent time, January - April
100 per cent time, May - July
1.3 Documentation
The following documents were produced during the
reporting period.
Status Reports:
Semi-annual status report, NASA Research Grant
NGR 23-005-622, July 1974
Technical Reports:
R. J. Sundstrom, "On-line diagnosis of sequential
systems - II." Systems Engineering Laboratory
Technical Report No. 81, The University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, July 1974.
R. J. Sundstrom, "On-line diagnosis of sequential
systems - III." Systems Engineering Laboratory
Technical Report No. 84, The University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, January 1975. (Part of final technical
report)
Papers:
J. F. Meyer and R. J. Sundstrom, "On-Line diagnosis
of unrestricted faults," IEEE Transactions on Com-
puters, Vol. C-24, No. 5, May 1975. (To appear)
6J. F. Meyer, "Computation-based reliability analysis,"
Digest of the 1975 International Symposium on Fault
Tolerant Computing, IEEE Computer Society, June 1975.
(To appear)
Final Report:
J. F. Meyer, "Theory of reliable systems." Final
technical report for NASA Grant NGR 23-005-622,
Systems Engineering Laboratory Technical Report
No. 83, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
January 1975.
2. SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL ACTIVITY
In keeping with the general objectives of the research
project (see 1.1), several specific investigations were
proposed for study durin the reporting period, (See
Proposal No. ORA 73-1167-KB1, "Theory' of Reliable Systems,"
March, 1973). Early in the reporting period, it was
-decided that work during the year should focus on two of
these investigations, namely:
(1) Reliability Analysis - Determine appropriate
measures of system reliability that can be evaluated
relative to some specified level of structural description,
and develop models for reliability analysis, with respect
to the above measures.
(2) On-Line Fault Diagnosis - Determine structural
and behavioral properties of systems that are conducive
to their "on-line" diagnosis; and determine methods for
7altering the design of a system to improve its on-line
diagnosability. As contrasted with "off-line" diagnosis,
an on-line diagnostic procedure must contend with (i) system
input over which it has no control and (ii) faults that
occur as the system is being diagnosed.
With respect to each of these investigations, the
technical report that follows describes:
(1) Background that motivated the activity;
(2) A summary of the results obtained;
(3) Topics for further investigation.
Detailed descriptions of research performed under the
grant are contained in various technical reports and
papers prepared during the reporting period (see 1.3).
Collectively, the latter documents comprise a detailed
final report of our research activity.
2.1 Reliability Analysis
2.1.1 Background
A review of the current state of the art of relia-
bility analysis reveals a situation common to relatively
new fields; namely, the tendency to hold on to concepts and
methodologies that were introduced when the field first
began to develop. Early objects, of reliability analysis
were pieces of electronic communication and control
equipment whose functional requirements were relatively
easy to specify. Accordingly, what constituted "success"
or "failure" of such systems was also easy to specify and
usually directly related to the operation of physical
components. Consequently, reliability measures such as
"probability of success," "mean time to failure," "availa-
bility," etc., were unambiguous. Calculation of such
measures followed naturally from information about the
reliability of physical components.
During the past thirty years, however, the structural
and functional complexity of man-made systems has increased
tremendously, particularly in the computer field. Conse-
quently, the analysis of reliability has become more complex.
Considerable research effort has been devoted to developing
formulae and computer prog~rams to facilitate the calculation
of traditional reliability measures for modern digital
computers.
In general, this research has been based on formal
models of the structure of the system being analyzed,
and have implicitly carried along underlying notions of
success and failure which are directly tied to the operation
of structural components. (See [1]-[4], for example.)
However, structure and function are no longer so closely
related to each other in a modern, digital computer. What
we mean by "successful operation" of a computing system
is a notion that is allied much more closely with function
than with structure. In fact, "successful operation" is
determined by (and dependent on) the functional require-
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ments of each particular application which are likely
to make distinct types of structural demands upon a
machine.
For example, consider the differing requirements of
the following uses of a large computer system: (1) a
research and educational tool at a large university and
(2) an automatic control and computation device aboard
an aircraft or spacecraft (see [5], for example). In the
first case, the demands upon the system are relatively
constant over time and potentially utilize the entire
system at any point in time. Furthermore, there is a
very limited sense in which one could discuss "graceful
degradation" of such a system. In the latter environment,
however, requirements do vary with time, (for example ,
programs and data necessary for take-off may be unnecessary
later), and some functions may be considerably less cri-
tical than others.
The example just cited is indicative of the need to
more fully account for the behavior of a computer when
analyzing its reliability. To accomplish this, reliability
measures must refer to concepts of system success which
involve more than just the status of various components
or subsystems. The questions "Just what should be
involved?" and "How is the involvement formalized?" were
the primary questions that motivated our present activity
in this area.
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2.1.2 Present Activity
The purpose of the investigation summarized below
was to give a precise meaning to the notion of a compu-
tation-based reliability analysis and indicate what kind
of things must be considered if reliability measures are
to more accurately reflect the computational needs of the
user. Toward this end, we attempted to accomplish the
following tasks during the reporting period:
(1) Develop a model of a "computer with faults"
that can. represent the effects of both permanent
and transient physical failures, and permits
the formal specification of computation-based
success criteria.
(2) Using the model developed in (1), formally
represent computation-based success criteria
as "tolerance relations" on computations, and
establish a precise notion of "success"
(relative to a given tolerance relation).
(3) Using the concept of success developed in (2),
formulate reliability measures that reflect the
ability to rely on a system (when modeled as
a computer with faults) in some specified use
environment.
(4) Show how measures developed in (3) can be
evaluated, and compare the results with those
obtained using more conventional structure-
based measures.
.Research directed toward the accomplishment of each
of these tasks has been conducted throughout the reporting
period. Results obtained during the first half of the
period were reported on in detail in the Semiannual Status
Report [6]. During the second half of the period, concepts
developed in connections with tasks (1) and (2) were
refined where necessary, and work continued on tasks
(3) and (4). Results of the total effort are described
in the Technical Report "Computation-based Reliability
Analysis" [7]. A paper with the same title, summarizing
the Technical Report, has been accepted for presentation
at the 1975 Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing in
Paris, France, June 1975 [8].
Briefly reviewing the results of this effort (as they
relate to each of the four tasks described above):
(1) By modeling a (digital) computer as a discrete-
time and, in general, time-varying system;- it was shown
that both permanent and transient (physical) failures
can be represented by specifications (called "faults")
for altering the prefailure transition .function in an
appropriate way. Given a computer C and a fault f, the
computer with the altered transition function is denoted
Cf (and called the "result of f"). A "computer with
faults" was then defined as a triple (C,F,p) where
C E~ (c is the class of "computers"), F is a set
of faults, and (:F 6 where p(f) = C Associated
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with each C EV is a set of "state-behaviors"
{aq q is a state of C} and, in turn, a set of "compu-
tations" where each computation is a quadruple
(q,i,x,aq(x)) with "initial state" q, "initial time" i,
"input sequence" x and "state trajectory" aq(x) . Such
computations are the basis for subsequently defined
concepts of "success." (See [7], Section 3 for a
detailed development of these results.)
(2) Computation-based success criteria were formally
represented as reflexive relations (called "tolerance
relations") on the set of all computations. Given a
tolerance relation a, the formalism developed in task (1)
permitted the following precise definition of computa--
tional success: If u is a computation of computer Cf
and u' is the corresponding computation of the fault-
free computer C (i.e., u and u' have the same initial
state, initial time, and input sequence) then u is a
"a-success" if u stands in the relation a to u' . (See
[7], Section 4.)
(3) Although we had hoped to formulate several
reliability measures (or "utility" measures as they are
referred to in the Langley-augmeted objectives), most
of the effort here was devoted to the most basic reliability
measure, "probability of success." Time constraints
precluded a similar treatment of other measures such as
"mean-time-to-failure," "availability," recoverability,"
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etc., but we feel that these other measures can be dealt
with in a similar fashion. Since "success," as defined
in task (3), is the success of a computation, the pro-
bability of (system) success (in the use environment)
requires a probability space for the computational
environment as well as for the computer. Each of these
spaces was formulated separately and then combined
under the assumption that computational requirements are
independent of faults. Letting P denote the measure for
the combined space, the probability of a-success of a
computer C (called the "reliability of C") was formu-
lated as P(H) where H is the set of all "environment-
fault" descriptions (e,f) such that the computation
f f(e, (x)) of C is a c-success. (See [71, Section 5.)
(4) It was demonstrated how measures of the type
developed in task (3) could be evaluated, using a read-
only memory (ROM) as an example. For a specific set of
assumptions regarding the probabilistic nature of memory
faults and the computational environment of the ROM,
the computation-based analysis yielded a reliability of
.9904 while a conventional structure-based analysis yielded
a reliability of .9680. (See [7], Section 6.)
2.1.3 Topics for Further Investigation
The results summarized above indicate that reliability
analysis can indeed be formalized so as to reflect the
ability of the user to rely on the computations a computer
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performs (as opposed to the computer itself). It is also
clear that the research performed to date is only a be-
ginning in this direction, and there are a number of
topics that deserve immediate investigation.
The first of these is the further exploration of
examples that illustrate-how the probability of
(computation-based) success can be evaluated (see task (4),
Section 2.1.2). We had hoped to do more of this during
the present reporting period, but time did not permit.
Secondly, other reliability measures such as "mean-
time-to-failure," "fault-tolerance," "availability" and
"recoverability" should be given a computation-based
formulation. In particular, recoverability (i.e.,
"coverage" 31 ) should be focused on since it is inherently
a computation-based measure. As remarked on in our
detailed report [7], many structure-based models employ
coverage as a parameter but cannot be used to determine
the values of this parameter.
Third, there is need to consider specific instances
of the general model that are closer to particular appli-
cations problems. The purpose of the general model has
been to formalize reliability measures along with the
information required to evaluate the measures. However,
to obtain a useful tool for assessing the reliability
of a special class of systems (e.g., aircraft computers),
the model must be specialized to permit practical methods
of evaluation usingpractically available data.
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Fourth, the evaluation methods just referred to must
be investigated. This includes simulation methods as
well as analytic methods. When simulation methods are
employed, the simulation should account not only for the
probabilistic nature of faults but also for the proba-
bilistic nature of the computational environment. The end
product of this last investigation should be a set of
algorithms which, given reasonable constraints on computer
time, computer memory and cost, can evaluate a set of
computation-based reliability measures.
The four topics outlined above are in close keeping
with Langley-augmented objectives I and II (see Section 1.1)
and, we believe, comprise a logical next-step in the
development of-meaningfiul and useful reliability assessment
methods for aircraft computers.
2.2 Diagnosis
2.2.1 Background
In an increasingly large number of applications
(e.g., communications switching, aircraft and spacecraft
flight control, hospital patient monitoring) there is an
obvious need for computers which are capable of operating
for extended periods of time with extremely high
reliabilities. Existing techniques for improving system
reliability are traditionally divided into "passive"
techniques (e.g., quadding,TMR) and "active" techniques
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(e.g., stand-by sparing). The passive, or "fault-masking"
techniques are frequently less complicated to implement,
but a number of studies ([9] - [11]) have shown that it will
be difficult if not impossible to achieve desired relia-
bilities--on a cost effective basis--through the exclusive
use of passive techniques. Thus there seems to be wide-
spread agreement that the future will bring ever wider
use of active techniques.
Implied by such active techniques is the ability to
detect a module which has failed and replace it with a
standby spare before system failure occurs. In fact, many
analyses of such systems (e.g., Mathur [1]) implicitly
assume that failed modules are detected instantaneously.
Such fault diagnosis techniques date back to the relay,
computers developed by Bell Laboratories in the early
1940's, where biquinary codes were used to dynamically
check the operation of the computer. A general survey
of the use of codes was made in 1959 by Peterson and
Rabin [12], where they showed that combinational circuits
can vary greatly in their inherent diagnosability.
Since then, the techniques that have been developed
can be classified into two broad classes--off-line diagnosis
and on-line diagnosis. Off-line diagnosis embraces those
techniques where the system input is controlled." For
example, running special diagnostic programs on a computer
is a form of off-line diagnosis. On-line diagnosis, in
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contrast, refers to diagnostic techniques which do not
interfere with normal operation of the computer.
Obviously, on-line techniques are in general more
desirable in real-time applications, where interruption
of processing to run diagnostic programs is not possible.
The use of coding schemes, parity bits, and the like are
familiar on-line techniques. In addition, a number of
special on-line diagnosis methods have been considered
which apply to specific hardware subsystems, such as adders
or counters (see [13], for example).
A theoretical study of on-line fault diagnosis was
initiated under NASA Grant NGR 23-005-463. Our discussions
with NASA-Langley convinced us of the need for improved
on-line techniques which are suitable for incor-pcratic
into the architectures envisaged for computers designed
for high-reliability applications.
The initial problem was to formulate an appropriate
class of system :models (i.e., a class of "systems with
faults") that would serve as the basis for the study.
It was decided that conventional models of time-invariant
systems (e.g., sequential machines) are inadequate because
they cannot represent the dynamics of a system which is
experiencing faults. The representation finally selected
was a class of resettable discrete time systems, "which
were adequate to represent both the structure and behavior
of faulty and fault-free systems. In this formalism
a fault f is represented by a triple f = (S',T'.O), with
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the interpretation that a system S which experiences
fault f is, as a result, transformed into system S' at
time T , with transient state behavior 0 . The result
of f is the system S , which behaves like S up to time ,
and S' thereafter.
These systems were made resettable by including in
the system description a reset function p:R x T Q ,
where R is a finite nonempty set, T is the time base, and
Q is the state set. This reset function has the inter-
pretation that if reset r is applied to the system at
time t-1 , then the system will enter p(r,t) at timet.
Distinguishing the reset function is simply a matter of
convenience. The same effect could have been achieved
by incorporating an equivalent function into the general
state transition function.
Once this model was selected, it was possible to
formulate definitions for intuitive notions like fault
tolerance, error, and diagnosability, in the overall
context of on-line diagnosis. To summarize briefly, if
S is a system and f is a fault of S, we say that f is
tolerated if Sf mimics the behavior of some. specified
system S. Otherwise, f causes errors (i.e., erroneous
behavior). Our notion of on-line diagnosis involves
an external detector (assumed fault-free) which monitors
system S. More specifically, if F is the set of all
faults to which S is susceptible, then S is (D,k) diag-
nosable if, for all f e F
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(i) D responds negatively if S is fault-free,
(ii) D responds positively within at most k time
steps following the occurrence of f.
The work outlined above is described in a rigorous fashion
in [141.
2.2.2 Recent Activity
Activity during the reporting period was focused on
investigating the diagnosis of two sets of faults: the
set of "unrestricted faults" and the set of "unrestricted
component faults."
The set of unrestricted faults of a system is simply
the set of all possible faults of that system, that is
(flf is a fault of S1. It is easily seen that this set
of faults can cause any possible erroneous behavior, and
so this is a "worst-case" study. However, as the scale
of integrated circuit technology becomes larger, it grows
increasingly difficult to postulate a restricted class
of faults which would contain all faults that one might
encounter in real systems. Obviously a system subject
to any fault can give no information about what its
correct output should be. Therefore, for the diagnosis
of unrestricted faults, it is crucial that the detector
D observe the input to S directly.
This immediately suggested one possible configuration
for D, namely that D be an identical replica of S, running
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in parallel, plus appropriate disagreement detectors.
However, we investigated the question of whether one
could not devise a (D,k) detector for S which is less
complex than S itself. We were able to prove this is
impossible. If we take number of reachable states as
a measure of system complexity, we showed that if a
system is on-line diagnosable for the unrestricted set of
faults, then the detector must be at least as complex as
the original system. Moreover, this result is true even
for an arbitrarily large time delay k
One subset of systems which was given special investi-
gation was the class of information lossless systems.
Intuitively, an information lossless system is a system
with an inverse. That is, S is an inverse for S if S,
given the output of S as input, produces the input of S
as output, with some fixed time-delay n. In this case,
S is lossless. If no such S exists, S is lossy. The
advantage of lossless systems is that they permit the
use of loop checks, (i.e., comparing the output of the
inverse system to the original input. A common example
of a loop check is the use of multiplication to check
division.) Further, it may be that the inverse system
is less complex than the original system.
Our investigation showed that an inverse system
can always be used for unrestricted-fault diagnosis if it
too is information lossless. This condition is sufficient,
but not necessary. Under certain conditions a lossy
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inverse will also suffice. Of course, not every system
has an inverse, let alone a lossless one. However, we
have shown that every system has a realization to which
this scheme can be successfully applied. A detailed
discussion of the above results can be found in [14]
and [15].
The second general class of faults that we investigated
was the set of unrestricted component faults. This set
arises naturally from the study of systems which can be
decomposed and represented as networks of resettable state
machines. Informally, an unrestricted component fault is a
fault which affects only a single component machine, but which
may affect that component in an unrestricted manner.
Under certain conditions such a network can be
diagnosed by a combinational (e.g., no delay elements)
detector, and we determined what the necessary.and
sufficient conditions were. We were further able to show
that any network could be transformed into a combinationally
diagnosable network by the addition of a single component
whose complexity was no greater than the most complex
component in the original network. We were also able to
obtain a lower bound on the complexity of any component
which will make the original network combinationally
diagnosable. Detailed statements and proofs of these
results can be found in [151.
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2.2.3 Topics for Further Investigation
Although much progress has been made toward achieving
a thorough understanding of on-line diagnosis, there are
many areas that deserve further investigation. Our study
to date has dealt with generally unstructured systems.
While such an approach is well suited to the development
of formal concepts, and to the identification of important
parameters, certain questions can be better answered
in a more structured environment. One reason for this
is that, with a structured system, we can consider
restrictions on the causes of faults. For example, given
an abstract system it makes no sense to speak of faults
caused by bridging failures. However, given a circuit
diagrm of a specific system., for exape, we ca discuss
specific types of failures and determine the corresponding
faults.
There are many different structural levels that
could be explored in a meaningful way. Two levels that we
feel to be particularly promising are the binary state-
assigned level and the logical circuit level. A system
is said to be binary state-assigned if the state set
Q = {0 ,1 }n for some positive integer n., In particular,
the problem of memory failures in such a system has obvious
relevance to the subject of digital computers. This
topic has been considered in the context of fault tolerance
and off-line diagnosis by Meyer [15] and Yeh [16]. Only
a limited amount of structure is needed to discuss such
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faults, and thus they can be analyzed before the cincuit
design of the machine is finalized. Also, having isolated
the memory faults, the remainder of the system is com-
binational, and hence inherently easier to analyze.
Finally, time-space tradeoffs are possible in the diagnosis
of memory faults. We have not had time to investigate
this question properly, but it seems clear that there is
room for much study in this area.
A system possesses structure at the logical circuit
level if a representation of the system can be given in
terms of a logical circuit composed of primitive logical
elements. These may be of the NOR gate variety, AND-
OR-NOT,threshold elements, or any of the familiar similar
elements. This representation level is useful for
investigating failures in the primitive components.
Further work could also be performed at the archi-
tectural level of structural detail. It is at this level
that one is considering the problems of implementing on-
line diagnosis on a whole computer, while at the other
levels emphasis would be on diagnosing a single module.
In particular, we feel that emphasis should be placed on
investigating the problem of on-line fault location.
Another problem that could be studied by an extension
of our present (structural level) model is the problem
of automatic system reconfiguration under the control of
the detector. This could be achieved by allowing for
feedback from the detector to the system being observed,
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and gives promise of being a fruitful area for future
investigation.
Finally, in connection with general investigations
of the type mentioned above, an effort must be made to
examine specific subsystems of a fault tolerant computing
system, such as an ALU, a RAM, a ROM, etc. Here, guided
by the general techniques, one should seek specific imple-
mentations of an on-line diagnosable subsystem that is
tailored to a specific use and a specified class of anti-
cipated faults. Effort here should focus not only on the
design of detectors, but also on means for augmenting
the structure of the original system (a CPU, for example)
to facilitate detector design and possibly improve its
on-line diagnostic capability. This effort is in keeping
wiht Langley-augmented objectives IV and V (see Section 1.1)
and should be sustained. The effort is especially important
in connection with the implementation of highly reconfi-
gurable computer architectures, where the use of presently
known duplication and coding techniques may not provide
the necessary diagnostic capability.
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